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ALGORITMA BERDASARKAN PENJARAKAN HELLINGER UNTUK 
MENGESAN SERANGAN PENAFIAN PERKHIDMATAN TERAGIH KE 
ATAS PERSEKITARAN PERKHIDMATAN PANGGILAN SUARA MELALUI 
PROTOKOL INTERNET 
ABSTRAK 
Komunikasi suara melalui Internet kini telah mengalami pertumbuhan yang pesat 
pada peringkat rumah dan perniagaan sejajar dengan perkembangan Suara melalui 
Protokol Internet (VoIP). Pertumbuhan pesat bilangan pelanggan VoIP adalah 
disebabkan oleh fleksibiliti VoIP, kualiti perkhidmatan yang lebih baik dan kos 
perkhidmatan yang rendah. Pertumbuhan ini menyebabkan ramai pengguna berpindah 
daripada Rangkaian Telefon Bersuis Awam (PSTN). Protokol Permulaan Sesi (SIP) 
merupakan protokol yang digunakan dalam VoIP, bertanggungjawab dalam 
mewujudkan sesi antara pemanggil dan penerima untuk komunikasi dwiarah 
menggunakan mesej SIP.  VoIP, sepertimana perkhidmatan Internet yang lain, juga 
mengalami pelbagai isu-isu keselamatan dan kelemahan disebabkan pengenalan 
protokol-protokol baru di dalam infrastruktur rangkaian data tradisional yang sedia ada. 
Serangan Penafian Perkhidmatan Teragih (DDoS) adalah lebih mengancam berbanding 
dengan serangan-serangan lain. Tesis ini membincangkan serangan terhadap VoIP serta 
teknik pengesanan dan pertahanan terhadap serangan DDoS VoIP yang sedia ada. Ia 
juga mengemukakan suatu mekanisma untuk mengesan serangan DDoS dan 
mempertahankan perkhidmatan VoIP tanpa meletakkan beban tambahan ke atas pelayan 
SIP berdasarkan kepada penjarakan Hellinger. Algoritma yang disarankan terdiri 
daripada beberapa fasa analasis statistik untuk mengenalpasti penyerang. Ciri-ciri yang 
dipilih daripada paket yang diterima oleh pelayan SIP disemak dengan peraturan yang 
xv 
   
ditakrifkan untuk mengkategorikan paket daripada penyerang. Mekanisme yang 
dicadangkan mampu mengesan semua paket penyerang yang bertujuan untuk 
membanjiri pelayan SIP dalam peringkat awal lagi. Keputusan penilaian analisis 
mekanisme yang dicadangkan menunjukkan bahawa algoritma yang disarankan mampu 
memberikan kadar pengesanan dengan ketepatan yang amat tinggi dan dapat 
mengurangkan masa komputasi sebanyak 0.2293 saat untuk mengesan penyerang. 
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A HELLINGER DISTANCE BASED ALGORITHM TO DETECT 
DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS ON VOICE OVER 
INTERNET PROTOCOL ENVIRONMENTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Voice communication over the Internet has experienced rapid growth in homes 
and businesses with the development of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). The 
growth in number of VoIP subscribers is due to VoIP flexibility, Quality of Service and 
being low in cost. This growth has prompted a major shift from the traditional public 
switched telephone network (PSTN) which is circuit-switched to a packet-switched 
VoIP. The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), protocol used in VoIP, is responsible in 
creating session between a caller and a callee for bidirectional communication using SIP 
messages. The VoIP, as with other services on the Internet, also suffers from various 
security issues and vulnerabilities, arising from new protocols and the existing 
infrastructure of traditional data network. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack 
is more severe compared to other attacks. This thesis discusses different types of VoIP 
attacks along with the existing VoIP DDoS detection and mitigation techniques. The 
proposed work put forward an algorithm based on Hellinger distance to effectively 
detect and mitigate DDoS attack on VoIP service without putting additional burden on 
the SIP server. The proposed algorithm comprises of multiple statistical analysis phases 
to identify the attacker. The statistical phase helps to extract the features from the 
incoming packets. Then the data from the feature is processed and checked with 
dynamic threshold to categorize the attacker packets. The proposed algorithm is able to 
detect all the attacker packets flooding the SIP server in the early stage itself. Evaluation 
xvii 
   
results of the proposed algorithm indicates that the algorithm has a very high detection 
accuracy and reduce the computation time for detecting the attacker to 0.2293 seconds.  
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One of the emerging technology rapidly embraced by the market is Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP). This new technology that implements the services of Public Switched 
Telephone Network (PSTN), is changing the trend of voice communication services 
over the Internet.  Traditional PSTN is now being replaced by VoIP whose services 
are replaced abundantly in homes and enterprises (Cao et al., 2005). Telephone, 
Internet and Internet Protocol (IP) are the fundamental technologies in the evolution 
of VoIP. Alexander Graham Bell and Elisha Gray invented the first telephone in 
1870’s (Gorman & Carlson, 1990). The earlier telecommunication systems involved 
switches, buttons and relay systems. Then, Shannon’s concept of communicating in 
binary code transformed the entire digital communication from phone to the Internet. 
The Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) created time-sharing 
network of computers known as Advanced Research Projects Agency Network 
(ARPANET) in the year 1968 to develope Internet (Tronco, 2010). The development 
of online service companies provided proprietary information and email services 
during the popularity of Internet and personal computers. Dr. Vint Cerf invented the 
Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) (Leiner et al., 1997). This 
protocol directs the data packets to travel from the source to the destination.  
In 1995, Vocaltech Inc., introduced VoIP and their Internet phone allowed the 
users to communicate via computers (Schulzrinne & Rosenberg, 1999). VoIP helped 
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to transmit multimedia data in a single infrastructure. VoIP calls are made using peer 
to peer VoIP through computer, IP telephony as well as traditional phones. It paved 
the way for monetary savings by lowering the cost of user services such as unlimited 
long distance international calls as the data is transmitted through Internet. The call 
that is dependent on bandwidth increased the flexibility and popularity of VoIP as 
stated in (Zhao & Ansari, 2012). It provides better Quality of Service (QoS) than PSTN 
at comparatively less cost. The local call rates are reduced up to 40% and international 
call rates are reduced up to 90% using VoIP technology as stated in (Heckstall 2016). 
Hence, the voice network along with data network is integrated to lower the overall 
management cost and effort. 
In the early days, VoIP was unpopular due to its lack of high speed and low-cost 
Internet. As Internet connection became faster and cheaper, voice or data packet were 
used instead of PSTN. Furthermore, VoIP leverages on existing Internet infrastructure 
and does not require additional infrastructure requirements which made VoIP popular. 
In 1998, VoIP used less than 1% of all voice calls. There was a slow increase in VoIP 
users, which accounted for 3% in 2000 and raised to 25% by 2003 (Hallock, 2004). In 
2013, the Point Topic organization tracked the global VoIP operators and recorded a 
total of 155.2 million global subscribers (Topic 2013). Subscriptions for VoIP have 
increased substantially worldwide (Wansink 2016) and is predicted to grow further by 
2020. IBISWorld states that the VoIP industry’s contribution is expected to increase 
15.3% every year until 2017 as stated in (IBIS 2015). Due to this estimated increase 
in the near future, the flexibility for both residential customers and businesses in VoIP 
technology will substantially increase. Figure 1.1 shows the growth of VoIP 
subscribers indicated by Statista (Topic 2013). 
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Figure 1.1: Growth of VoIP Subscribers 
 
The survey conducted by (Wansink 2016) states that the fall of fixed-line PSTN 
subscriptions is compensated by the rise of the VoIP subscriber base. Another 
advantage of VoIP is phone portability where the device uses the same number all over 
the world. But in a legacy phone, the device is assigned a fixed number for a fixed 
location and this device number change when moved to a different location. The 
survey reported by Telco (Global, Services, & Report, 2015) states that the migration 
of PSTN to VoIP is inevitable due to the decline of PSTN revenue and growth of VoIP 
subscribers.  
As with any services on the Internet, VoIP too suffers from security issues due 
to the protocol design and components of the network which embraces the VoIP 
services (Anwar et al., 2008). The first and foremost concern about communication 
protocol were reliability and efficiency and security concerns were given less 
consideration. In July 2016, AT&T identified and reported malicious scans which 
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reached more than 30 billion and 245,000 of them were DDoS alerts (Jason Porter, 
2016). 
1.2 Security Issues faced by VoIP 
Many existing VoIP devices and programs have vulnerable spots for intruders with a 
wide attack space. Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) must have a high 
priority while considering the security issues (Coulibaly & Hao Liu, 2010). Various 
threats affect the CIA of VoIP systems. VoIP switches are more vulnerable to a wide 
range of network attacks like DoS, DDoS, eavesdropping, man in the middle attack as 
the Internet being the transition medium among the internal and external users 
(McGann & Sicker, 2005). The vulnerability is due to the lack of adequate control 
policies (Ur Rehman & Abbasi, 2014). Flood-based DoS and DDoS attack (Cha, Choi, 
& Cho, 2007; Hussain, Djahel, Zhang, & Naït-Abdesselam, 2015) have been identified 
as major threats among the other attacks. 
1.2.1 Malformed Message Attack 
A SIP message consists of header field and the message body. Malformed Message 
Attack uses the vulnerability of text-based protocol (Su & Tsai, 2015). These attackers 
manipulate Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) header deletion, overflow-space, non-
ASCII code to malfunction the proxy server or end user’s terminals (Sonkar, Singh et 
al. 2012). The attacker uses the malformed SIP Invite message to discover security 
flaws in the victim’s system. Figure 1.2 shows the absence of Request-URI followed 
by Invite method as per the standard SIP protocol syntax. The depicted Invite message 
is invalid as it is given null in the first line which violates SIP protocol specification. 
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Figure 1.2: Malformed Message Attack 
 
1.2.2 Spoofing Attack 
Spoofing attack involves an attacker masquerading as a legitimate user. Fraudulent 
emails, fake websites and wireless access point are provided to trick victims in 
collecting their personal data (Jayamali et al., 2016).  
 
Figure 1.3: Spoofing Attack 
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Spoofed BYE messages can be used to terminate ongoing sessions between the 
users (Sonkar, Singh et al. 2012). In Figure 1.3, the attacker (Kevin) forges SIP BYE 
message from the caller (Alice). Now the attacker acts as a legitimate user and send 
BYE message to callee (Bob) thereby terminating the legitimate session between the 
legitimate caller and callee. 
1.2.3 Eavesdropping Attack 
Eavesdropping affects the confidentiality of the VoIP user agent. The attacker secretly 
listens to the signalling and data streams between the user agents (Kolhar, Alameen, 
& Gulam, 2017) by sniffing the conversation between them. They can reply to the 
conversation and obtain secured information as shown in Figure 1.4. 
 
Figure 1.4: Eavesdropping Attack 
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1.2.4 Man in the Middle (MITM) Attack 
The MITM attack affects the confidentiality and integrity of user agents. The attackers 
listen to the conversation between the two user agents and masquerade on both the side 
as a legitimate user (Conti, Dragoni, & Lesyk, 2016). In Figure 1.5, the attacker makes 
new independent connections with the caller and callee. The private information is 
relayed between the end users through the attacker. Hence, the attacker controls the 
entire private conversation neglecting the old conversation between the caller and 
callee. 
 
Figure 1.5: Man in the Middle Attack 
 
1.2.5 Spam over Internet Telephony (SPIT) Attack 
SPIT involves the generation of unsolicited advertisements of pre-recorded messages 
and unwanted calls to the users as shown in Figure 1.6. The attackers have created 
VoIP bots (M. A. Akbar & Farooq, 2014) capable of harvesting data and advertising 
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dubious services at low cost. In terms of bandwidth and cost, SPIT is a potential risk 
(Ekekwe and Maduka 2007) which utilizes the bandwidth of the VoIP users. 
 
Figure 1.6: SPIT Attack 
 
1.2.6 Call Hijacking Attack 
Call Hijacking involves the attacker impersonating a user agent by spoofing the 
identity of the phone device (Butcher, Li, & Guo, 2007). The VoIP device is setup 
with the victim’s identity. Hence, incoming calls can be redirected to the attacker’s 
phone as shown in Figure 1.7. The attacker hijacks the call between user agent A and 
user agent B. Thereby, the attacker sends 301 moved permanently SIP response 
message to the user agent A along with the attacker’s own forwarding address. After 
which the conversation will be between the attacker and user agent A. Registration 
hijacking involves an attacker replacing the legitimate registration with false data 
9 
   
(Rasol, Al Kasasbeh, & Al Adwan, 2016). Thus, future calls to the legitimate users are 
redirected to the attacker using false registration message. 
 
Figure 1.7: Call Hijacking Attack 
 
1.2.7 Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attack 
Flooding attacks involve SIP phones generating massive number of SIP messages to a 
specific user agent within a short period. This hampers the services rendered by the 
user agent. Invite flooding is one of the more annoying attack for VoIP users. The 
major problem based on availability is DoS. VoIP network is susceptible to DoS 
attacks which degrades QoS quickly to an unacceptable level (Koutepas, 
Stamatelopoulos, & Maglaris, 2004). In DoS, VoIP telephony services are interrupted 
by the attacker due to excessive requests from a source agent to the destination user 
agent or the SIP server. In DDoS, a number of source user agent acts as botnets. These 
botnets are controlled by the attackers which can flood the destination user agent with 
minimal request from each. 
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Figure 1.8: VoIP Security Threats 
 
Hence DoS and DDoS try to disrupt legitimate user’s services causing service 
unavailability (Zeb, Baig, & Asif, 2015). Figure 1.8 depicts the different types of VoIP 
security threats. Based on the above threats, it is clearly seen that DoS and DDoS are 
the most vulnerable attack in real-time VoIP system. 
1.3 Problem Statement  
The motive of the attacker is to deny the service delivered by the VoIP server to its 
end users. The service is denied by exhausting the resources of the SIP server like 
bandwidth, CPU and RAM. Moreover, a DDoS attack damages the SIP server’s 
resource as VoIP is a real-time service. Thus, the excessive traffic generated by the 
attacker lead to service unavailability.  
The distributed flooding of SIP Invite packet provides new challenges to mitigate 
DDoS attack. As a result, a better DDoS mitigation solution is required to protect the 
users. Therefore, this thesis addresses the following issues: 
1. Various proposed DDoS detection and mitigation techniques fail to distinguish 
between the DDoS attack and flash crowds from legitimate users (Jeyanthi & 
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Sriman, 2012), which leads to monetary issues to the business in both private 
and corporate sectors. 
2. Most of the existing detection and mitigation techniques were tested in simulated 
environment and not in test bed environment. 
3. Existing detection and mitigation techniques are not effective in addressing 
DDoS attack since these methods detect the attack and manipulate only after the 
attack session reaches the SIP server. 
1.4 Thesis Aim and Objectives 
The main aim of this research is to detect DDoS attack on SIP server efficiently to 
ensure the service disruption due to such attacks can be reduced. This is culminated by 
the following objectives: 
➢ To propose a Hellinger distance based algorithm to detect DDoS attack. 
➢ To propose an approach which distinguishes the DDoS attack traffic and the 
flash crowds from legitimate users. 
➢ To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm during DDoS attack in 
terms of detection accuracy and false positive rate. 
1.5 Research Steps 
The key objective of this thesis is to design a behaviour algorithm to detect and 
mitigate DDoS attack effectively. To achieve this goal, we performed number of key 
research steps as illustrated in Figure 1.9. 
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In the first phase, the research problem is systematically demarcated and 
evaluated by exploring the concept of VoIP.  The research objectives and scopes are 
formulated by identifying the problems in VoIP Security especially DDoS attack. 
In the second phase, critical review of the existing DDoS detection and 
mitigation techniques discover the requirements of these techniques. Furthermore, the 
strength and limitations are formulated by investigating existing techniques against 
DDoS attack in VoIP environment. 
In the third phase, a VoIP environment is designed to study the impact of DDoS 
attack. Then, a algorithm is designed and developed to detect DDoS attack after 
obtaining information from the previous step. The design of the modules in the 
proposed algorithm is based on statistical analysis techniques which is integrated into 
VoIP environment. This algorithm comprises of four phases, namely Data Preparation, 
Feature Extraction, Anomaly Detection and DDoS Mitigation. 
In the fourth phase, the proposed algorithm is implemented in a test bed 
environment. The effectiveness of the proposed algorithm and its detection accuracy 
is tested and evaluated under different incoming SIP traffic rate. 
In the final phase, the results obtained from the evaluation process is justified. 
Finally, the output of all the phase is finalized and documented. 
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Figure 1.9: Research Steps 
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1.6 Research Scope and Limitation  
The proposed algorithm in this thesis is based on signalling DDoS attack at the 
application layer in the IPv4 VoIP environment. The scope of this research is limited 
to the detection of flood-based SIP Invite DDoS attack on VoIP servers. Multi attribute 
attacks like BYE flooding attacks are not considered in this research. The scope of the 
proposed DDoS detection and mitigation algorithm is based on the following 
assumptions: 
1. The proposed algorithm assumes the optimal feature selection as connections 
per second. 
2. The proposed algorithm bypasses the least number of DDoS SIP packets. 
3. The attacker's objective is to generate a high or low rate DDoS attack with a 
duration of more than one second against the VoIP server. 
1.7 Research Contribution 
The proposed algorithm can detect and mitigate DDoS attack in VoIP with improved 
detection accuracy. The main contributions of this thesis can be summarized as: 
• Implement the Queue steps to flush out the blacklist table under normal traffic. 
• Design and implement the anomaly analyser module to analyse the anomalies 
from the incoming SIP packets and calculate dynamic threshold. 
• Design and implement the anomaly detector module to detect the SIP DDoS 
attack packets from flash crowds corresponding to legitimate users.  
• To evaluate the experiment in the real VoIP environment, a private test-bed is 
required because DDoS attacks on a production environment may lead to 
disruption of services. 
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1.8 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized into six interconnected chapters as follows. 
Chapter 1 presents the objective of this thesis and provide brief background on 
the security issues in VoIP. The problem statement, objective, scope, limitations and 
research contributions are also provided in this chapter. The security issues on VoIP 
and the concerns related with it are also discussed. 
Chapter 2 provides the background of VoIP, SIP and Dos/DDoS attack. This 
chapter discusses and compares the most related research works in detecting and 
mitigating DDoS attack in VoIP. Furthermore, this chapter argues on the breaches in 
the research that has been accomplished so far and reports the necessity to detect and 
mitigate DDoS attack in real time VoIP systems. 
Chapter 3 introduces the methodology and the design of proposed framework. 
Modules involved in designing this algorithm have also been discussed. The 
behaviour-based algorithm for the detection and mitigation of DDoS attack in VoIP is 
discussed in detail. 
Chapter 4 discusses the overview of test bed setup. This chapter presents the 
implementation details of the proposed algorithm along with the tools and technologies 
used to run the experiments. 
Chapter 5 covers in-depth analysis of the proposed algorithm’s detection 
accuracy through detailed experiments. The comparison results between the proposed 
algorithm and other algorithms are stated in this chapter. 
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Chapter 6 summarizes the entire discussions and concludes the research covered 
in this thesis. Some future directives are also highlighted in this chapter. 
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BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
 
2.1 Introduction to VoIP Architecture 
The components of VoIP include the source agent, ATA (Analog Telephone Adapter), 
SIP server, gateway and destination agent as in (Miliefsky, 2010).  The VoIP 
architecture is shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: VoIP Architecture 
 
The voice signal from the source user agent is transmitted to ATA and then to 
the router to generate IP packets. A dial tone from ATA signifies connection to the 
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Internet. When a number is dialed, the tone is converted to digital data. The packets 
passing through the IP network reach the SIP server. The SIP server locates the 
destination user agent with the help of a location server. Here the phone number is 
checked for its validity and then they are mapped to an IP address. The packets are 
then passed on to the termination carrier which acts as the gateway to be connected to 
the destination user agent. Thus, a session is established between the two agents. To 
communicate between these agents, a uniform protocol should be used among them. 
The communication among the source user agent, SIP server and the destination user 
agent is linked by the SIP protocol. The ATA at the receiver’s end converts the packets 
back to analogue audio signals. The session is terminated by hanging up the phone. 
2.1.1 Importance of VoIP 
VoIP, which is employed for transferring voice data, is deployed internally for 
telephone services in a wide range of the military and government departments. It uses 
packet switched network carrying multiple calls on the same space (Keromytis, 2012). 
For instance, an IP network allows 5 to 10 times the amount of voice calls over the 
provided bandwidth. VoIP streamlines several calls through a circuit switch and then 
into an IP gateway reducing the consumption of bandwidth. On the other hand, PSTN 
uses circuit switching which occupies only one call per space. This requires a dedicated 
line for telecommunication activity (Meisel & Needles, 2005). Skype, Hangouts, 
Facebook, Myspace, WhatsApp and WeChat are examples of free Internet phone 
services (H. J. Abdelnur, State, & Festor, 2007). DOTA, a real-time game played via 
the Internet, uses VoIP technology. This helps the players to interact directly with other 
players as they play. 
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Traditional phone can be connected to the Internet via ATA. The analogue signal 
from the telephone is converted to digital signals which is sent to the Internet and vice 
versa. IP phones being used as a VoIP device differ from a traditional phone in the 
connector which uses a RJ-45 Ethernet connector. But the traditional phone is provided 
with RJ-11 phone connector for voice services. Hence, IP phones can be connected to 
the modem directly. Softphones are the software in the computer which make VoIP 
communication easier irrespective of the distance. Several free softwares are available 
for placing a VoIP call. 
VoIP can be deployed on a private network or on a public network. In private 
networks, PSTN and VPN integrate with VoIP. Users can be connected to this network 
internally but not externally, thus, avoiding attacks from external users. However, they 
are susceptible to internal attacks. In public network services, the users can access the 
system via Internet. This deployment is vulnerable to flooding issues from both 
internal users as well as external users. The topological implementation differs on 
theses VoIP deployments, but the attack algorithm and impact remains constant in both 
the systems. The SIP proxy server forwards SIP requests to the end users and receives 
responses from the corresponding users. The effect of SIP flooding on a SIP server 
was examined first. This research detects and mitigates SIP flooding attacks using the 
proposed algorithm to deliver better service to the end users. The VoIP test bed with 
the proposed algorithm in private network was used to analyse and verify the 
effectiveness of a SIP proxy server. 
2.1.2 VoIP Protocols 
VoIP technology consists of signalling and data transfer protocols. The functions of 
signalling protocols are to set up, manage and terminate a session. The supporting 
20 
   
signalling protocols are H.323, SIP, Media Gateway Controller Protocol (MGCP) and 
Stream Control Transport Protocol (SCTP). The data transmission protocols oversee 
transmitting voice data. The data transfer protocols are Real-time Transport Protocol 
(RTP) and Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP). The widely-used protocols 
are H.323 and SIP which are discussed in detail in this thesis. 
H.323: H.323 is a recommendation set from the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) (H. Abdelnur, Cridlig, & Festor, 2006). It is a 
protocol suite designed for the transfer of IP based multimedia communications in real 
time. They consist of a family of core protocols transported over TCP or UDP 
protocols (McNeill, Liu et al. 2006). H.225 helps in registration, admission and call 
signalling. H.245 is responsible for establishing and controlling the media sessions. It 
is also responsible for capacity and codec negotiation. T.120 is used in conferencing 
applications. The audio and video codec are defined by G.7xx series and H.26x series 
respectively. The media data are transmitted using RTP. RTCP is used for controlling 
RTP sessions (H. Schulzrinne, S. Casner, R. Frederick, 2003). 
Drawbacks of H.323: The main drawback of H.323 is its lack of scalability. 
H.323 locates users across zones. But in case of multiple domains, performance of 
loop detection is void, which leads to scalability issues. Development of 
supplementary extensions is challenging for this protocol. With several protocol 
components, H.323 faces complexity and complicates firewall traversal (Shore 2000). 
SIP: The standardization of SIP by Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is 
used by VoIP and other multimedia bidirectional communication like voice calls, 
video conferencing and data sharing (Rosenberg & Schulzrinne, 2002). SIP is an 
application layer protocol which creates, modifies and terminates sessions in VoIP 
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communications. Since SIP is a simple and flexible protocol, features can be added. It 
allows multiple multimedia sessions in one call as seen in online gaming, instant 
messaging and various services. The Uniform Resource Locators (URL) addressing 
scheme in SIP does not depend on the physical location (Berners-Lee, Masinter et al. 
1994). They are addressed by either a phone number, an IP address, or an e-mail 
address. It is similar to the HTTP web protocol as the messages comprise of headers 
and body message. The default port for SIP is 5060 for either TCP or UDP. The user 
datagram protocol (UDP) over the transmission control protocol (TCP) at the transport 
layer is favoured by SIP because of the connection orientation of SIP and the simple 
behaviour of UDP as in (Information Sciences Institute University of Southern 
California, 1981). 
2.2 SIP Architecture 
The three major components in a SIP communication are User Agent Client (UAC), 
the SIP proxy server and User Agent Server (UAS). The main network elements 
involved in the SIP communications are described in Figure 2.2. The User agent (UA) 
generates or receives SIP messages. It acts as a UAC for transmitting SIP messages. 
The receiver act as UAS. The SIP client acts as both a SIP UAC and SIP UAS. The 
SIP request from user agents are received by the SIP server and forwards them to the 
corresponding host. The Registrar server processes REGISTER messages and then the 
user’s URI are mapped to the present location of the user. The registrar server can be 
placed separately or inside the SIP proxy server. The Location server helps to store the 
location of registered users. The proxy finds the user’s location using the location and 
registrar server. 
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Figure 2.2: SIP Architecture 
 
The Feature servers provide special treatment to enhance the communications 
experience. The proxy server uses special routing rules to control the SIP feature. The 
Media server record media streams, play back recorded media, collect dual tone multi 
frequency (DTMF) input from the user. It uses a media bridge that mixes multiple 
media streams as in conferencing. When a user is on a different domain, the calls are 
connected using a Domain Name System (DNS). The redirect server returns a 
forwarding address when a user is moved temporarily from the current domain to the 
next domain. Session Border Controller (SBC) in SIP protects the internal network 
from any malicious attack. Signalling and Media Gateway enables non-SIP 
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interactions, while Signalling Gateway translates signalling protocol and the Media 
Gateway transcodes media data. 
2.2.1 SIP Messages 
The SIP components are provided with a SIP address which resembles an email 
address. This address contains a username followed by a hostname. SIP operations are 
performed between them by exchanging messages. SIP messages used for 
communication purpose have message header similar to HTTP (Fielding, Gettys et al. 
1999). These messages are in the form of request and response as shown in Figure 2.3.  
 
Figure 2.3: SIP Messages 
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UAC uses a request message and UAS uses a response message. The SIP request 
messages are REGISTER, INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, BYE, and OPTIONS. The SIP 
response messages are PROVISIONAL (1XX), SUCCESS (2XX), REDIRECTION 
(3XX), CLIENT ERROR (4XX), SERVER ERROR (5XX) and GLOBAL FAILURE 
(6XX). SIP messages in the form of a text-based presentation are vulnerable to attacks. 
2.3 Denial of Service Attack 
The normal services on a phone system can be disrupted by a DoS attack (Sisalem, 
Kuthan, & Ehlert, 2006). The DoS attack scenario is depicted in Figure 2.4. The 
attacker can attack the user agent or the SIP server. 
 
Figure 2.4: DoS Attack Scenario 
When the attacker attacks on a particular user, the user is unable to respond to 
the calls. Similarly, when the attacker attacks the SIP server, the entire network is 
